Your developers already installed MCP servers. Do you know what they run?
Every server in the official MCP registry, scanned every day and signed: what it installs, who built it, and whether it has changed hands since you approved it. Check it in ChatGPT or Claude, pin it in CI, gate it in ToolHive, and hand your auditors a record anyone can verify without trusting us.
MCP is stuck between the laptop and production. Security is the reason.
Engineers adopted MCP faster than anyone could govern it. In Stacklok's July 2026 survey of enterprise engineers, 86% of MCP use is still experimentation or local development, only 5% run governed, enterprise-wide production, and 49% name security and compliance as their biggest blocker. OWASP now lists tool poisoning (MCP03) and shadow MCP servers (MCP09) in its MCP Top 10.
The problem underneath is simple: a team approves a server by its name, and the code behind that name keeps moving. Here is what our signed scan of the whole registry found this week.
Figures: our daily signed scan of 42,172 servers in the official MCP registry, 12 October 2026 (live numbers). Survey: Stacklok, State of MCP in Software 2026, 100 senior engineers at US and UK enterprises. OWASP MCP Top 10.
Check it. Pin it. Gate it. Prove it.
One signed verdict per server, the same everywhere your people make a decision: in the chat window, in the pull request, at launch, and in front of an auditor.
- CheckAsk ChatGPT or Claude through the Redthread connector, open a verify page, or run
atpp check-configagainst the servers already in your Claude, Cursor or VS Code config. Your config never leaves your machine. - PinEvery claim names the exact npm, PyPI or container digest that was scanned and the repository that built it, so you can pin what you run to what was checked.
- Gate preview
atpp gateallows or denies a launch: in CI on every pull request, or in front of ToolHive. Your allow-list and egress policy become a ToolHive permission profile. - ProveSigned in-toto claims, a daily manifest anchored in Sigstore Rekor and committed to a public log, co-signed keyless. Anyone can verify offline, including your auditor.
One signed answer, three people who need it
check-config in CI fails a pull request that adds a swapped, phantom or foreign-built server; the ToolHive profile enforces the egress list at runtime. Developers keep moving; you keep the line.What it covers, and what it does not
| Risk | What ATPP does | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Approved server changes hands | Flags the listing swap on every claim; the gate denies it | live gate: preview |
| What runs is not what was approved | Exact artifact digests in the claim; the gate compares the image digest | live gate: preview |
| Shadow MCP servers (OWASP MCP09) | Finds every configured server, in CI and on laptops; allow-list policy | preview |
| Tool poisoning and rug pulls (OWASP MCP03) | Flags a remote server whose tool definitions change without a new version, and a changed listing or artifact. Local servers, and changes made only for some callers, need inspection in the request path | remote partial |
| Code review of the server itself | Not done: a claim covers the published listing and its artifacts | out of scope |
Evidence your identity provider can act on
Identity providers such as Okta, Microsoft Entra and CrowdStrike decide who an agent is and what it may do. Keep them. What they don't produce is evidence someone else can check: a signed record of what the agent actually did, and whether it is still the agent you approved. ATPP adds that record alongside your identity provider, and its signals can feed the decisions your gateway makes. Attestation vs. authorisation.
Four questions you can't answer about your agents right now
None of these are hypothetical. They're the questions that arrive in an incident channel at 11pm, or in an enterprise security questionnaire on a Tuesday — and today the honest answer to all four is a shrug.
Attackers compromised executive devices, then didn't need to breach anything else. The platform's own trading agent already held unbounded permissions, and moved 261,000+ SOL tokens on command. The model didn't fail. The prompt didn't fail. There was simply no enforceable, verifiable limit on what that agent was permitted to do — and no signed record of it doing it.
Same agent. Same permissions. One of them can prove itself.
Agentic Trust & Protection Platform doesn't slow your agents down or route their traffic through us. It doesn't replace your identity provider either. It changes what exists after they act — and for teams who want more than a record, ATPP Enforce adds an inline checkpoint, opt-in and gated (see below).
- Identity is a long-lived API keyStored in an environment variable, shared between services, rotated when someone remembers.
- Scope is a hopeWritten into a config once. Never enforced at the moment of action.
- Actions are unlogged or self-loggedWhatever the agent's author chose to write down, in a format nobody agreed on.
- Trust is a sentence in a PDF"We limit our AI agent's permissions." Unverifiable, so discounted.
- Revocation takes minutes to hoursFind the key, rotate it, redeploy, hope.
- Identity is a short-lived signed certificateA unique spiffe:// identity per agent that rotates automatically and can't be replayed.
- Scope is checked at every actionGranted scope is evaluated when the agent reaches for a tool, not when it was deployed.
- Every action is signed and streamedA tamper-evident event log you didn't have to ask an engineer to build.
- Trust is a signed record anyone can checkGreen while it stays in scope, red when it doesn't. The badge is only a pointer; the signed document behind it verifies offline against your public key.
- Revocation is immediate and automaticAn out-of-scope action suspends the identity itself — the next call fails.
Four steps from "we think it's fine" to "here's the proof"
No framework rewrite, no gateway to route traffic through. Agentic Trust & Protection Platform sits beside the agents you already run.
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Register the agentPoint Agentic Trust & Protection Platform at a LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, or custom agent process. Container, Lambda, or laptop — it doesn't matter where it runs.
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Issue an identityUse the identity your provider already issues, or, if you don't have one for agents yet, each agent gets a unique
spiffe://identity and a short-lived signed certificate. Not a key in an env var — an identity that rotates and can't be replayed. -
Broadcast signed stateEvery tool call, scope request, and data access is signed and streamed as a trust-state event. This is the audit trail nobody had time to build.
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The badge goes live
greenwhile the agent operates inside its granted scope.redthe moment it doesn't — an escalation attempt, an out-of-scope read, or a tool it was never issued.
One mark. Binary meaning. Anyone can check it.
Every other product in this category gives you a console your security team logs into. This gives you something you can hand to a customer.
Every action this agent has taken since its last identity rotation stayed inside its granted scope. Verified against the signed event log, not asserted by its owner.
This agent attempted an action outside its granted scope. Its identity was suspended automatically, the call failed, and the attempt is in the log with a timestamp.
Every badge links to a verify page. The document behind it is Ed25519-signed with the workspace key, published at a stable URL — anyone can check the signature offline without calling us. Unknown or expired renders grey. Red only on a proven exploit or a signed out-of-scope action.
Seven rules that make the badge worth checking
Badges are easy to launch and hard to make anyone check. These are the rules the product enforces — each one is verifiable by a skeptical engineer, and none of them can be bought.
The badge went from a record to a checkpoint.
Everything above happens after an agent acts. ATPP Enforce puts a decision point in front of the request — a gateway your agent's traffic runs through, checked against a grant you write, before anything reaches its destination.
- The request already leftBy the time an action is logged as out of scope, it already happened.
- Scope is a tool nameAn allowed tool can still carry a malicious argument.
- The agent reports on itselfNothing stops it from simply not reporting the one call that matters.
- Checked before it leavesHost, method, path and body size against a grant — a denied request never reaches its destination.
- Catches the workaround, not just the askRefused, then reached through a different route — the same signal, whatever the mechanism.
- A stranger can verify itEvery forwarded request carries a signed receipt. The site on the other end can check it with no account and no relationship to you.
You cannot switch on blocking by accident.
Every new grant starts in shadow — it decides and records, and forwards everything, exactly like the recording layer above. There is no setting that puts a fresh identity straight into blocking traffic.
This is a preview: the whole point of a checkpoint is that it has to earn the traffic it blocks, so we are not shipping one that hasn't. Ask about early access →
Land it in an afternoon, not a procurement cycle
You shouldn't need a signed MSA to find out whether your agent is behaving. Talk to us when you need SSO, long-term log retention, or a few hundred agents — not before.
- Up to 10 agent identities
- Live green/red badge, embeddable anywhere
- Signed trust-state event log: your most recent 5,000 events
- Automatic revocation on out-of-scope action
- Community support
- Up to 50 agent identities
- Event log through the API, and a webhook stream for your own SIEM
- Email support, next business day
- Time-based log retention, Slack & PagerDuty alerts on revocation (planned)
- Up to 250 agent identities
- Everything in Team
- Priority support
- Audit-ready log export, SSO/SCIM, and a custom domain for your badges (planned)
Billed monthly, or yearly at 20% off. Start free, then choose Team or Business under Settings → Billing in the app. Items marked planned are not available yet and are not part of what you are buying today.
Everyone sells control. Nobody sells proof.
Agent and non-human identity is a real, funded category — three of its fastest-growing names were acquired into larger platforms during 2026. Here's how the independents present themselves, and where we think the gap is.
| Vendor | How they lead | Category word | Start without sales? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agentic Trust & Protection Platform | "Your developers already installed MCP servers. Do you know what they run?" | MCP server trust & agent evidence | Free forever, self-serve |
| Okta for AI Agents | "See & secure your AI workforce." | Agent identity & access | Enterprise sales |
| Aembit | "IAM for Agentic AI" — secretless workload access | Secretless access | Free tier, published pricing |
| Natoma | "Let your AI know everything your company knows." | Managed MCP | Free tier, published pricing |
| P0 Security | "Authentication gets agents in. Authorization controls what happens next." | AuthZ control plane | Pricing page, no figures |
| Token Security | "Identity-First AI Agent Security" | Identity-first | Demo required |
| Clutch Security | "Every Identity. Every Agent. Every Secret." | Non-human identity | Demo required |
| Britive | "Zero standing privileges by design" | PAM transformation | Qualification form |
| Andromeda | "Identity Security for the Agentic Era" | Identity posture (ISPM) | Demo required |
Public marketing copy as published September–October 2026. Vendors iterate quickly and several of these are excellent products — if you're running a large enterprise identity program, some of them are a better fit than we are. Verify current details directly before you decide.
Most of the category leads with some arrangement of discover, secure, govern. "Non-human identity," "runtime authorization," and "zero standing privilege" are all spoken for. We don't compete on those words.
Every product in this category produces control, and control lives inside a console your security team logs into. None of them produce an artifact you can show someone else, and none of them check whether the MCP servers your agents install are still the ones you approved. That's the gap. We work alongside them: your identity provider decides access, and ATPP supplies the signed evidence it can act on.
Not the identity program. The platform engineer who granted an agent production access this week and wants proof before anyone asks. That person can't get past a qualification form at 11pm.
Know what your agents can do. Prove it to everyone else.
Register your first agent, get its identity issued, and put a live badge somewhere in about five minutes.